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 1
Roots of Animosity: Bonn’s Reaction to American Pressures in Nuclear 
Proliferation 
 
 
 
 In April 1978, German chancellor Helmut Schmidt complained to U.S. 
Ambassador Walter Stoessel that “there was probably no chancellor in the twenty-
nine year history of the Federal Republic who was as closely tied to the USA as he 
was. At the same time, there was probably hardly a period when as many irritations 
emerged as in the last fifteen months.”
1
 Although this claim was self-serving, 
suggesting that Washington, not Bonn, was the cause of friction,  the question is 
justified why some of the most serious German-American post-war crises festered 
under the leadership of one of the most “Atlanticist” German chancellors. More than 
that, the Carter Administration also possessed all the attributes that should have 
facilitated harmonious transatlantic relations, particularly after the acrimonious 
episode over Henry Kissinger’s “Year of Europe” in 1973/1974.
2
 Jimmy Carter had 
been member of the Trilateral Commission, an elite group dedicated to improve U.S.-
European-Japanese relations, he emphasized his preference for cooperative 
partnership over unilateral leadership, and he supported a more united Europe, not 
least by being the first U.S. president to visit the EC Commission in Brussels in 
January 1978.
3
 
 Despite such promise, the antipathy between Carter and Schmidt was 
legendary. An arch-realist himself, Schmidt later denigrated Carter as a “moralist and 
idealist,” charged him with ignoring “the interest of America’s German allies,” and 
blamed him for the worst bilateral dynamics “since the days of Lyndon Johnson’s 
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 2
dealings with Ludwig Erhard.”
4
 While Carter was more circumspect in his own 
memoirs, his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski accused Schmidt of 
arrogance and a “patronizing attitude.” According to Brzezinski, it was Schmidt who 
was responsible for “the deterioration in American-German relations in that [he] made 
it both fashionable and legitimate in Germany to derogate the U.S. President in a 
manner unthinkable in earlier times.”
5
 
 Personal antipathies were part of the story, but most scholars have emphasized 
policy disagreements, with the row over the neutron bomb, the euromissiles debate as 
well as Carter’s categorical stance on human rights chief among them.
6
 These 
examples, however, obscure the first major controversy about a German-Brazilian 
agreement on nuclear cooperation, a controversy that set the tone for this troubled 
partnership. Although this crisis has been discussed in the more technical literature on 
nuclear proliferation and some of its aspects are receiving more attention recently – 
the Brazilian dimension, for example, in the pioneering work of the Fundação Getulio 
Vargas – its impact on transatlantic relations has not been sufficiently explored. Only 
Klaus Wiegrefe devotes a separate chapter to the Brazil deal in Das Zerwürfnis, a 
book on the antagonism between Carter and Schmidt.
7
.  
 On the one hand, this omission may be attributed to the prevailing opinion that 
the controversy ended as “abruptly” in April or June 1977 as it had begun a few 
months earlier and that other crises dominated transatlantic relations.
8
 On the other 
hand, the relative lack of attention is surprising for several reasons. The controversy 
was very public at the time, involving not only the two governments, but their 
parliaments and publics.
9
 More importantly for the historian, this first major row 
influenced mutual perceptions and showcased systemic changes in the transatlantic 
relationship in the 1970s that exacerbated such quarrels. The crisis reflected a more 
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assertive Europe and Germany, the impression of the United States as a country still 
in post-Vietnam and post-Watergate crisis and a wide gulf in the perception of nuclear 
energy and proliferation, with the  United States increasingly emphasizing the dangers 
of weapons proliferation and the Europeans considering nuclear programs and exports 
as indispensable to their economic and energy security.  
 Based primarily on material from German archives, this article focuses on 
Bonn’s response to U.S. pressures to refrain from nuclear exports. This exploration 
opens a window on a drastically changed relationship since earlier days in the Cold 
War and it demonstrates how both sides exacerbated the crisis with their negotiating 
tactics. Despite professions of transatlantic cooperation, the Carter Administration 
proceeded far more unilaterally than its immediate predecessor, whose response to the 
deal will also be analyzed in order to assess the justification of Bonn’s outrage at 
Carter’s interference with the Brazil agreement. Led by intransigent negotiators – and 
against the advice of substantial parts of the Foreign Office – the German side insisted 
on its right to export nuclear technology. By staking their respective national 
credibility on their reading of the German-Brazilian agreement, both sides made 
compromise difficult, if not impossible. Although the controversy shows a resurgent 
West Germany, the Schmidt government inadvertently continued earlier Cold War 
patterns as well, by abdicating responsibility for the military dimensions of the deal, 
perfectly content to leave this aspect to the superpower patron. 
 
 At the heart of this controversy was a perceptive dissonance about the uses 
and impact of nuclear energy. Up until 1974, most nations had approached nuclear 
weapons and civilian uses of nuclear energy separately. The Non-Proliferation Treaty 
of 1968 sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but permitted its signatories 
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civilian uses and the export of nuclear technology. The guarantee of civilian usage 
and export rights was actually the major reason why West Germany, initially reticent 
about abdicating more of its national sovereignty by forsaking nuclear weapons, opted 
to sign the treaty.
10
 For the United States in general and the Carter administration in 
particular, however, “Smiling Buddha,” the explosion of an Indian nuclear device in 
1974, made this bifurcated approach redundant because India’s bomb had been 
developed with the help of a civilian nuclear program, primarily provided by Canada 
and the United States. Carter mentioned this threat as early as December 1974 when 
he announced his candidacy for president and he repeated it in a programmatic speech 
to the United Nations in May 1976. He warned of “the spread of facilities for the 
enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent reactor fuel because highly 
enriched uranium can be used to produce weapons” and he recommended a 
worldwide moratorium on exporting such facilities. These activities, however, were at 
the heart of a June 1975 agreement on nuclear cooperation between West Germany 
and Brazil. The agreement was the first to provide a full nuclear fuel cycle to a 
developing country, including the sale of two nuclear plants, reprocessing, and 
enrichment facilities and technology. With a value of twelve million marks, it was 
also the Federal Republic’s largest export deal to date. Given Carter’s warnings, it 
was not surprising that he would hone in on the agreement. Already in the previous 
administration, Richard Livingston of the Environmental Protection Agency singled 
out Brazil as “one of the most critical areas, since it is on [sic] the midst of purchasing 
a reprocessing plant from Germany,” which would enable it to produce weapons 
grade plutonium. In addition to that, with its military dictatorship, Brazil was a focal 
point of Carter’s human rights policy, although this hardly figured in either German 
deliberations or bilateral talks on the nuclear deal.
11
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 5
If “Smiling Buddha” was Washington’s reference point in recent history, that 
of the German government – and of most European nations – was the 1973 oil crisis. 
The shortages the Europeans had experienced more acutely than the United States 
convinced them of the need to decrease their dependency on external energy supplies 
with the help of nuclear power. Representative for the approach of most European 
countries to the problem, French President Giscard d’Estaing insisted at the World 
Economic Summit in London in May 1977 that the partners discuss the issues of 
nuclear energy and reprocessing in relation to energy security: “The point of departure 
is energy needs, not the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
12
 
In addition to energy security, the Europeans also insisted on exploiting the 
commercial potential of nuclear energy. They had invested heavily in the 
development of the sector and had only recently become competitive in a field that 
had long been dominated by the United States. As U.S. Ambassador Walter Stoessel 
observed, Germany had an added interest in exporting its technology because the 
domestic market was unable to absorb the nuclear industry’s potential, in part because 
of a budding anti-nuclear movement. Undersecretary Peter Hermes, the Foreign 
Office official tasked with negotiating the Brazilian deal, emphasized that domestic 
demand accounted for only 40% of the nuclear industry’s business. The sheer 
magnitude of the deal with Brazil, moreover, was also considered an important 
macroeconomic stimulus in the economic crisis of the 1970s.
13
 Commercial 
competition was a particular aspect of German-U.S. relations over the agreement 
because Brazil had initially approached Westinghouse. Only when the U.S. giant was 
prohibited from exporting sensitive technologies and furnishing a full fuel cycle did 
the Brazilian government turn to the Germans.
14
 U.S. companies’ competitive 
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disadvantage was thus intimately tied to their government’s increasing proliferation 
concerns. 
Despite this important change, segments of the German government, industry, 
and media clung to the suspicion that U.S. opposition to the Brazilian deal was 
partially motivated by trade competition. When Fred Iklé, director of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in the Ford Administration, suggested 
delaying the Brazil deal until the Suppliers Group of the most important nuclear 
supplier nations agreed upon new export guidelines, Hermes countered: “If we give in 
to such an American proposal, we would run the danger of losing the deal with Brazil 
without contributing to the cause of non-proliferation in any way. We cannot exclude 
the possibility that the Americans would ultimately step in.” German Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher reiterated such suspicions to his Brazilian counterpart 
Antônio Azeredo da Silveira when they met to sign the agreement in June 1975, and 
they were not dispelled by Carter’s subsequent approach either. After the president-
elect had announced his intention to re-examine the agreement in November 1976, 
German industries speculated about the presence of “concealed interests” in his 
motives. Even when Schmidt acknowledged Carter’s “idealistic motives” for his non-
proliferation policies, he told Italian Prime Minister Andreotti that there were also 
“tangible motives of competition in large parts of American industry and commerce, 
politics, and labor unions.”
15
 Apparently, Germany’s own interest in the commercial 
opportunities of nuclear exports colored its perception of American motives. 
Irrespective of how they rationalized U.S. non-proliferation pressures, the 
Germans insisted on the legitimacy and importance of a commercial opportunity 
worth twelve billion marks. . German newspapers warned as early as December 1976 
how damaging a cancellation of the Brazil deal would be. At the height of the 
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 7
controversy in March 1977, Schmidt confronted Secretary of State Cyrus Vance with 
evidence detailing the number of jobs in the German nuclear industry that would be 
lost. “For me personally, this aspect is extraordinarily important,” concluded the 
chancellor.
16
 
In addition to defending commercial motives, the German side employed a 
mix of legalistic and idealistic arguments. As German political scientist Karl Kaiser 
put it, “German diplomats rarely miss an opportunity to make a fitting legal point.” At 
the heart of their case was Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which 
guaranteed to each signatory “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials 
and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy.”
17
 Although Article IV gave Germany that right, Brazil had not signed the 
NPT – a fact regularly underlined by U.S. critics. Nevertheless, German negotiators 
insisted that the Brazil deal adhered to the stipulations of the NPT. They added that 
they had negotiated additional safeguards in a tripartite agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which subjected Brazil’s nuclear 
industry to meaningful controls for the very first time. This was one “idealistic” 
component of the German justification: Supposedly, the agreement possessed model 
character because, as Schmidt put it before the National Press Club in Washington, 
“by those treaties with the Brazilian government, we have brought the Brazilian 
government to undertake even greater duties toward nonproliferation than they would 
have to undertake if they were a partner to the nonproliferation treaty.” The second 
legalistic argument was that the Brazilian contract had to be executed even though 
Bonn subsequently agreed to refrain from similar export deals. “Pacta sunt servanda,” 
Genscher said in a conversation with Carter. German negotiators attempted to give 
this argument an idealistic hue as well. If the deal with Brazil, and similar deals with 
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other Third World nations, were cancelled, these  countries would feel discriminated 
against and the split between nuclear haves and have-nots would be deepened. In one 
of the best expositions of this argument, Hermes lectured Soviet Ambassador Valentin 
Falin that Third World countries could not understand why nuclear nations tried to 
prevent them from acquiring nuclear technology when they themselves had not even 
fulfilled all stipulations imposed by the NPT, particularly in the realm of 
disarmament. Genscher went as far as castigating Washington’s non-proliferation 
approach as “technological colonialism.” In response, Germany arrogated to itself the 
role of champion of Third World concerns, insisting that these nations would have to 
be invited to future multilateral negotiations about nuclear export restrictions and 
safeguards – a suggestion that Jessica Tuchman, director of the Office of Global 
Issues in Carter’s National Security Council and a “hawk” on proliferation issues, 
considered as an attempt to dilute and weaken the non-proliferation agenda.
18
 
 Although U.S. officials could not deny that Germany was entitled to nuclear 
exports under the NPT, they doubted increasingly that additional IAEA safeguards 
would obstruct potential weapons programs. These safeguards, they warned, only 
applied to the facilities furnished by West German companies. Nothing could prevent 
Brazil from using German technology to build other facilities for military purposes.
19
 
While the Germans mainly sidestepped the question of Brazil’s desire for nuclear 
weapons, U.S. decision-makers were convinced that Brazil was pursuing this option. 
When Brzezinski wrote to Carter that “Brazil clearly wishes to hold open the option 
for nuclear arms,” the president commented: “Clear to me also.” Assurances in the 
Brazilian press that the German-Brazilian agreement would “lead to the building of 
the bomb only in the very far future” were hardly reassuring either.
20
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 9
Attacking the German justifications in one of the key talks in Washington in 
mid-February 1977, Joseph Nye, political scientist and Deputy Undersecretary of 
State, stressed that the NPT no longer sufficed to prevent proliferation. Instead, all 
nuclear nations should commit to a moratorium on reprocessing and technology 
exports until the matter had been studied further. The German justification, Nye 
implied, failed to take into account the lessons of “Smiling Buddha,” which had been 
made possible by a civilian nuclear program. Responding to the pseudo-idealistic 
references to discrimination of Third World nations, Undersecretary Warren 
Christopher countered “with great conviction that the USA would be willing to accept 
such discrimination if it meant preventing a nuclear catastrophe.”
21
 In American eyes, 
particularly in the Carter Administration, the prevention of nuclear proliferation took 
precedence over commercial opportunities and national sensibilities. It is obvious how 
difficult it would be to reconcile the American and German positions on the Brazil 
agreement. 
 
 Along the lines of its legalism, Bonn’s objection to Carter’s approach also 
rested on the claim that the previous Ford Administration had tacitly acquiesced to the 
Brazil agreement. This reading conveyed the impression of an unreasonable, 
overbearing, and excessively moralistic U.S. partner, which came to dominate 
German attitudes and which exacerbated the transatlantic crisis. Nevertheless, this 
narrative depended on a partial misreading or misrepresentation of previous U.S. 
government policy and it was actually challenged by German officials within the 
Foreign Office who objected to the Brazil deal on the same grounds as the Americans. 
In this regard, understanding when U.S. opposition began in earnest reveals the fault 
lines within the German government, the wishful thinking of the defenders of the 
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 10
treaty, and ultimately the stubborn determination of the Schmidt government to 
realize the deal. 
 Before Carter entered the White House, German officials downplayed U.S. 
opposition. Retrospectively (and disingenuously), Hermes claimed that he was not 
aware of “official American criticism as long as President Ford and Secretary of State 
Kissinger were in office.” During a visit to the United States in October 1975, 
Chancellor Schmidt publicly claimed that the U.S. government had never protested 
against the German-Brazilian agreement. Although the German Ambassador to 
Washington, Berndt von Staden, informed Schmidt afterwards that this was incorrect, 
it is remarkable that the chancellor felt confident enough to say so in public. This may 
indicate that initial U.S. criticism was disregarded or conveniently rationalized in the 
chancellery.
22
 Nevertheless, this impression was inaccurate. Lawmakers, experts, and 
the press registered strong public concerns about the envisaged treaty from the start. 
In June 1975, the Washington Post labeled the agreement “precedent-breaking” and 
“reckless.” Democratic Senator John Pastore (RI), co-chairman of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, charged that it would make a “mockery of the Monroe 
Doctrine.” He expressed outrage that West Germany, “of all countries in the world,” 
was doing this: 
I say West Germany should have consulted the United States. After all, we 
consult them. The majority leader says we will forget the withdrawal of 
troops this year in order to satisfy them. Now they come along, and they 
give all the facilities to Brazil, which is not too far away from the United 
States of America, the capability to make a bomb. 
Alluding to successive amendments proposed by Senate Majority Leader Mike 
Mansfield to reduce U.S. troops in Europe, Pastore implied that West Germany 
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“owed” the United States something in return for U.S. security guarantees. If Pastore 
banked on allied Cold War  security dependency, his colleague Stuart Symington was 
not above resurrecting traditional fears, when he suspected that the Germans of being 
interested in acquiring nuclear weapons themselves. In a moment of bilateral crisis, 
the ideas and motives behind “dual containment” were obviously still alive and well.
23
 
 Ford Administration officials approached the Germans behind closed doors. 
As already mentioned, Iklé visited the German embassy in early March 1975 to 
register “substantial concerns” about the sensitive parts of the agreement – enrichment 
and reprocessing – and he asked for a delay until a joint decision by the Suppliers 
Conference. Weeks later, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll again urged the 
Germans to delay until further safeguards had been added. In response to these 
concerns, Bonn negotiated the aforementioned tripartite agreement, which subjected 
German-built facilities in Brazil to IAEA safeguards. Nevertheless, this did not fully 
allay U.S. concerns, which the U.S. Ambassador at the time, Martin Hillenbrand, 
shared as late as mid-June, two weeks before the conclusion of the treaty.
24
 
 Several reasons help explain why Bonn seemed relatively impervious to such 
concerns. Before Carter became president, most criticism originated from experts, the 
press, Congress, and low- to mid-level executive officials. In this sense, there was at 
least initially a different quality to the opposition mustered during the Carter 
Administration. German diplomatic records create the impression that high-level U.S. 
officials, above all Kissinger, belittled criticism of the Brazil deal. Throughout 1975, 
the issue was barely discussed at the top level. In Washington in mid-June, President 
Ford did not raise it at all, whereas Kissinger merely suggested how both sides should 
present the Brazil deal to the press. These low-key responses just before the signing of 
the agreement with Brazil facilitated ignoring criticism from other quarters.
25
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Nevertheless, in response to Carter’s and Congress’s increased non-
proliferation pressures, the issue resurfaced in 1976 when the Ford Administration 
initiated a wholesale reevaluation of its nuclear policies. In this climate, Kissinger 
voiced more serious concerns about German nuclear exports – this time about an 
envisaged deal with Iran, which included reprocessing technology as well. In a 
meeting in May 1976, Kissinger told Genscher: “The more I think about regional 
reprocessing, the less I like it. Maybe we shouldn’t sell any.” When Hermes and 
Genscher pointed to their safeguards, Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt objected that these 
contained no sanctions if Brazil or Iran “kicked” the German partner out. Although 
they conceded that they would not move against the Brazil agreement, they asked the 
Germans for a moratorium on further exports of sensitive technology. Against the 
background of Ford’s upcoming address on non-proliferation in October, Kissinger 
was similarly blunt, referring to the export of nuclear technology as a “true concern of 
the US government.” 
26
 Although high level concerns with German export policies 
thus clearly increased, Bonn was able to rationalize them – in part because of its own 
interests and in part because the signals from Washington continued to be mixed. 
Contrasting the aforementioned U.S. with the German record of the May 1976 
conversation illustrates the former. Whereas Kissinger had clearly expressed his own 
worries in this meeting, the German note taker underlined that the Secretary of State 
had warned of “serious political consequences with Congress” if Bonn concluded a 
sensitive agreement with Iran.  If the German record seems slanted in this instance, 
congressional pressure was also a dominant theme of Kissinger’s rhetoric. Even when 
he communicated the administration’s “true concern” about German policies, he still 
labeled the deals with Brazil and Iran as “quite reasonable” and predicted sanctions 
only if Carter were elected. Kissinger’s position in the review of non-proliferation 
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policies in the summer of 1976 may provide the key to understanding the mixed 
signals emanating from Washington. Weighing the option of realizing U.S. non-
proliferation goals against allied wishes, Kissinger warned: 
It should be recognized that if the suppliers, many of whom are also our allies, 
do not wish to follow a US initiative voluntarily, then we will either have to 
coerce them or jeopardize our non-proliferation policy. Clearly, we should not 
select a strategy which could so easily trap us in such a dilemma. 
While this was primarily a strategic thought, Kissinger – and with him other officials 
in the State Department – also substantively believed that it would be wrong to force 
the allies to adopt U.S. non-proliferation policies. As Helmut Sonnenfeldt put it in a 
discussion in March 1976, coercing the allies by cutting off nuclear fuel “would mean 
the death knell for NATO.”
27
 Key officials in the Ford Administration were not 
convinced that non-proliferation should be pursued at the expense of all other foreign 
policy objectives. This, as well as Kissinger’s obvious lack of interest in proliferation 
matters, may have facilitated Schmidt’s and Hermes’s impression that serious 
criticism only emerged under Carter. Nevertheless, the fact that Hermes was present 
when Kissinger raised doubts about German export policies raises questions about his 
retrospective account that there was no U.S. opposition under Ford.  
Still, since the Ford Administration’s criticism remained mild and 
contradictory, it was quite easy to rationalize U.S. pressure as emanating from 
Congress and therefore not so harmful for German-American relations as a 
controversy with the executive. Localizing the source of criticism in Congress also 
facilitated suspecting commercial motives because Congress is traditionally the locus 
for lobbying. Most importantly, though, German rationalization of U.S. pressures 
demonstrated the fallout from Watergate – not necessarily because allies believed that 
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the U.S. had lost power, but because they thought that Congress felt emboldened to 
challenge the executive. In several meetings with foreign officials, Genscher 
explained criticism of the German-Brazilian agreement as the outcome of the 
constitutional post-Watergate struggle: “From time to time, foreign policy topics have 
to serve as pretexts to test the relative strength of Congress and the administration.” 
American criticism of German nuclear export deals was thus interpreted  as a function 
of the power struggle between legislature and executive. This not only made it easier 
to belittle the gravity of U.S. concern, but also to paint the incoming administration as 
unreasonably moralistic and ideological. This was precisely the impression Hermes 
gained in his first meeting with members of the new administration in January 1977. 
In addition to that, he thought that its opposition was partially based on “anti-German 
resentment” – another feature that made U.S. pressure look illegitimate.
28
 
Although the Ford Administration’s cautious approach may have facilitated 
disregarding American concerns,  the German government obviously also had the will 
to push ahead. This becomes most evident in how easily internal German opposition 
to the agreement was dismissed. Within the Foreign Office, the strongest lobby for the 
agreement was Section 4, which dealt with foreign trade and which had long been 
headed by Hermes who was promoted to Undersecretary of State in August 1975. The 
Political Section 2 of the Foreign Office, on the other hand, was skeptical of nuclear 
exports. The strongest opposition came from disarmament specialist Ambassador 
Hellmuth Roth. During the critical phase of German-Brazilian negotiations in 
February 1975, Roth submitted a memorandum, which raised all the concerns the 
Americans had formulated about the insufficiency of the safeguards. Nevertheless, at 
this stage, it was Hermes’s positive recommendation for the treaty, which entered the 
cabinet draft.
29
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Roth submitted an even starker memorandum before the treaty was signed and 
he demanded that it be shared with Genscher. This time, Roth emphatically attacked 
the justification for the agreement, particularly the idea that it was commensurate with 
non-proliferation. Roth called that a “self-delusion,” concluding: “The Federal 
Government must clarify whether it considers a verbal non-proliferation policy 
sufficient, which is based on a legalistic interpretation of NP treaty stipulations, or 
whether also we consider non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as an existential 
question.” Carter Administration officials could not have formulated a stronger 
critique. In reaction, Genscher suggested consultations in handwritten notes on the 
document, but these never took place and the memorandum seems to have languished 
in the corridors of the Foreign Office until it was shelved as “no longer urgent” in 
mid-November.
30
 
Even after conclusion of the agreement, however, Section 2 tried to contain 
potential damage to non-proliferation and transatlantic relations. In early July, its 
head, Günter van Well, recommended a moratorium on further export deals until the 
Suppliers Club had agreed on new guidelines. The Brazil treaty, he emphasized, 
“should not be considered a model for further treaties about the supply of sensitive 
facilities.” Concretely, van Well discouraged the treaty with Iran that was being 
discussed. In effect, he supported what Kissinger had suggested in May. Yet, when 
Schmidt visited Iran in November, he told the Shah that his government would only 
be guided by its own interests and not by the results of the Suppliers Conference. 
With some astonishment, even the new head of the Foreign Trade Division noted that 
Schmidt had far exceeded the position that the Foreign Office had prepared for his 
talks.
31
 Obviously, enthusiasm about export opportunities outweighed concerns over 
non-proliferation in the Schmidt government – and this was even true in the wake of 
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the controversial Brazil agreement. In this light, it is fair to say that there was less of a 
misunderstanding of U.S. opposition and more determination to brush the partner’s 
concerns aside. 
 
The German government’s enthusiasm for the export potential of nuclear 
technology and its (mis)perception of Ford’s policies explain in part why the 
confrontation with Carter grew as virulent as it did. Further explanation can be 
adduced from the “undiplomatic” way in which both administrations approached 
negotiations, assuring that their discussions would be elevated to a question of 
national prestige. This clash illustrated the degree to which the transatlantic alliance 
had become looser and the Europeans more self-confident by the late 1970s. 
 Months before talks started, both parties committed themselves to irrevocable 
positions. Carter had notified the world of his non-proliferation priorities in the 
United Nations speech in May 1976 and he followed that up with threats, such as the 
“supply of nuclear fuel only to countries cooperating with strict nonproliferation 
measures,” in the Democratic Party Platform. With respect to Germany’s nuclear deal, 
the candidate was most concrete towards the end of the campaign: “I’ve also 
advocated that we stop the sale by Germany and France of reprocessing plants for 
Pakistan and Brazil.” Even though the hyperbole may have been due to campaign 
rhetoric, this was not the statement of a “trilateralist,” committed to consultation and 
cooperation, but that of a unilateralist, who would force the allies to comply. Different 
to Kissinger and Ford, Carter was not prepared to weigh non-proliferation concerns 
against other foreign policy interests. Still in May 1977, after relations with the allies 
had already been considerably strained, Carter reaffirmed publicly that he would 
pursue non-proliferation “even at the risk of some friction with our friends.” 
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According to Scott Kaufman, such single-mindedness reflected the new president’s 
tendency to “compartmentaliz[e] policy.” Schmidt, on the other hand, had clearly 
outlined Germany’s unequivocal commitment to execute the deal during a visit to 
Washington in July 1976.
32
 
 Both sides left little room for compromise and staked their respective 
credibility on safeguarding their approach to the Brazilian question. In late November 
1976, vice president elect Walter Mondale confidentially asked Schmidt not to 
execute the agreement before the inauguration. Given the acrimonious debate that 
followed, Schmidt’s initial reaction behind closed doors was quite moderate. 
Although he and his cabinet insisted that West German industry had every right to 
implement the treaty, Schmidt acknowledged that “political considerations” could 
force his government to relent. He decided on a delay in order not to confront Carter 
with a fait accompli.
33
 
 This conciliatory attitude did not last, however. At home, the Schmidt 
government came under pressure from the nuclear industry and the press, which 
criticized U.S. meddling. This was the point when respective calendars clashed: 
Whereas the Germans felt under pressure to resolve the issue as soon as possible,
34
 
the incoming Carter Administration preferred settling the specific disputes with 
Germany and France only after it had decided its overall approach to non-
proliferation. This objective was complicated by the rivalry between at least three 
factions in the administration, which held escalating hardline attitudes towards the 
legitimacy of any international nuclear cooperation.
35
 
 Time pressures were compounded by Bonn’s choice of representative in the 
talks, Undersecretary Hermes, whose approach was particularly uncompromising. 
Quite fittingly, Hermes has described himself as impulsive and there were several 
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examples, when he brought this attitude to the table. As previously mentioned, 
Hermes was the agreement’s strongest advocate in the Foreign Office, having 
managed to sideline all opposition from Section 2. Before he went to Washington for 
the first round of meetings in mid-January, Hermes underlined his hard-line stance in 
a meeting designed to flesh out a negotiating position. When Otto Hauber, specialist 
on disarmament issues, suggested that Bonn could delay the agreement’s first 
concrete step, the transmission of plant blueprints, Hermes objected. He also rejected 
Foreign Minister Genscher’s interest in exploring an alternative suggested by Carter, 
in which the United States would guarantee the supply of enriched uranium for 
Brazilian reactors, thereby making Brazilian enrichment and reprocessing 
redundant.
36
 It must have been obvious to all involved that Hermes would be similarly 
uncompromising in Washington. 
 The Americans were also responsible for raising the stakes before crucial talks 
in February. In late January, Vice President Mondale visited Bonn and subsequent 
press leaks angered Schmidt. Although the chancellor had asked for confidentiality, 
the press reported that “Mondale persuaded the West German leader that President 
Carter was unalterably opposed to the treaty as it now stands, and Mr. Schmidt agreed 
to continue to explore ways of changing it.” Vance added in a news conference that 
the administration wanted to “obviate the construction” of the enrichment and 
reprocessing plants.
37
 These remarks not only re-emphasized the controversy, they 
also created the false impression that the German government was preparing 
alternatives when it actually felt that there was nothing to negotiate – an attitude that 
was justified from Bonn’s point of view, but that severely prejudiced the upcoming 
talks. 
Page 18 of 50
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rinh
The International History Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 19
 The ground was prepared for tense talks in early February. Dry diplomatic 
correspondence rarely conveys drama, but Hermes’s reports from Washington are an 
exception. In substance, neither side budged from their positions outlined above, but 
the tone was very controversial. As Hermes emphasized in his memoirs, he had no 
mandate to renegotiate or suspend the deal with Brazil. He went into the meetings 
“guns blazing,” emphasizing that he was happy to discuss non-proliferation in 
general, but not the treaty with Brazil. He insisted that this had to be reflected in the 
press release. Hermes attacked the U.S. alternative of guaranteed uranium supplies for 
Brazil in two separate ways: On the first day, he questioned its reliability in view of 
recent delays in similar supplies for Brazil and Europe. In the second meeting, he took 
more fundamental exception by explaining that such supplies would compete with a 
start-up supply of uranium to be delivered by the Dutch, British, and German 
enrichment consortium URENCO. Once again, Hermes revealed Bonn’s commercial 
interest in the Brazilian treaty. Occasionally, the conversation bordered on the 
irrational. When Undersecretary Christopher reiterated that Brazil could use German 
civilian technology to build a bomb, Hermes snapped: “India was supplied by others.” 
Hermes alluded to American responsibility for the Indian nuclear program, but this 
was a double-edged sword because he implicitly acknowledged the validity of the 
U.S. argument that civilian programs could be abused for military purposes – 
something Hermes was always keen to deny in the Brazilian case. In such an 
emotional atmosphere, both sides parted without progress. If the German government 
proceeded with the transmission of the blueprints without further consultation, 
Christopher warned, there would be “highly unwelcome consequences.”
38
 
 Another measure of how confrontational the talks were is provided by the fact 
that Ambassador von Staden, who had accompanied Hermes, felt obliged to write a 
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personal letter to Genscher. Von Staden recommended more flexibility in the German 
position, for example trilateral consultations with Brazil, which Christopher had 
suggested, but which Hermes had rejected. More fundamentally, he urged Bonn to 
appreciate the “global responsibility” which the United States felt with regards to non-
proliferation. The letter implicitly criticized Hermes and  illustrated the persistence of 
different approaches within the Foreign Office. The criticism was not lost on Hermes 
who commented: “If I were sensitive, I would have good reason to be angry about this 
letter.”
39
 
 German-American relations had reached a low point, yet no solution was in 
sight. In the New York Times, David Binder evaluated the round of consultations in 
February as “something of a diplomatic setback” for the Carter Administration. 
American approaches to the Brazilians did not fare any better. As memoranda from 
Azeredo da Silveira to President Geisel demonstrate, the Brazilian side was not 
prepared to step away from the agreement with Germany and rejected the idea of 
replacing national reprocessing and enrichment with U.S. uranium supplies not only 
as unreliable, but as fundamentally unacceptable because it would put Brazil in a 
“permanent position of dependence.” Already in November 1976, an unidentified 
spokesman of the Ministry of Mines and Energy had accused the Americans of 
behavior “worse than that of our common enemies, the Russians,” whereas another 
unidentified source likened U.S. policies to “Teddy Roosevelt’s Latin American 
policing policies.”
40
  
Meanwhile, the Germans felt under increasing pressure to deliver the 
blueprints because the delay had already met with “a severe reaction” in Brasilia. In 
Washington in mid-March, Genscher asked his American counterparts to de-escalate 
their  importance lest “the public considers this to be the archimedic point of German-
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American relations.” Once again, he emphasized Bonn’s agreement with the 
overarching objective of non-proliferation, but also the German mantra that the treaty 
with Brazil actually furthered that objective by committing a non-signatory to the 
essence of the NPT. Further steps toward that goal, he insisted, had to be non-
discriminatory and multilateral. Implicitly criticizing American negotiating strategies, 
Genscher warned: “The less the impression predominates that the federal government 
is being pressured by the US, the more flexible the government will be in its 
decision.”
41
 
 Genscher’s warning demonstrates how U.S. pressure, often public, became a 
political problem for Bonn as it concerned national prestige and sovereignty. The 
same was true in Brazil where the press and officials complained of heavy-handed 
treatment and where Azeredo da Silveira complained to the president “that the 
Americans themselves only belatedly worried… about the same question of face, on 
the Brazilian side.” Back in Germany, the head of the Foreign Office’s planning staff, 
Klaus Blech, blamed Carter for poisoning the atmosphere by vowing to use “all 
diplomatic means” against the Brazil agreement. This resentment of being lectured to 
and having to wait for a U.S. decision was shared by all political parties and elites in 
Germany, even by those who thought that the U.S. position on the issues had merit. 
On March 23, therefore, a newly founded Council for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear 
Energy, composed of representatives of relevant ministries, parliament, and industry, 
left the decision of when to send the blueprints to the chancellor. His timing seems to 
have been dictated by the news that Carter would make a major statement on non-
proliferation, for which he demanded German reactions within seventy-two hours. 
Schmidt feared that this statement might negatively affect the Brazil agreement and he 
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also bristled at the American request, which he saw as an ultimatum. A March 31 
meeting with Vance in Bonn gave him the opportunity to vent his anger: 
I deplore [the demand], particularly because the subject is not that easy… I 
was also surprised that President Carter had once promised me on the 
telephone to offer a wide-ranging scale of alternatives. I have not seen those 
up to now. And now we are being asked to respond, until tomorrow, to a 
declaration which will be delivered next week… I would expect that the 
American government does not undertake something unilaterally which should 
be carefully considered… We will cooperate, but you will not get many to 
cooperate if you step on their toes and then ask them to join the London 
Suppliers Group. By this, I mean reneging on the Brazilian treaty. We cannot 
subject the implementation of our treaties to the consent of third parties. 
Schmidt rejected U.S. unilateralism in its approaches to non-proliferation in general 
and to the Brazil deal in particular. Like Azeredo da Silveira, he blamed the 
Americans for having turned the issue of the blueprints into a question of prestige: 
“The longer we wait, the more laden with prestige the matter will become” and he 
complained: “I will lose face in front of parliament and our industry [if I do not 
implement the treaty]”. Therefore, Schmidt decided to approve sending the blueprints 
and specified that they had to be transmitted before Carter’s declaration.42 
 This was the climax of the German-American controversy over the Brazil 
deal. The Carter Administration suffered its first setback in a larger non-proliferation 
strategy that was not yet fully developed – something that Brzezinski had actually 
warned the president about in early March. As J. Samuel Walker has pointed out, “the 
Carter administration’s efforts were not only unsuccessful but also counterproductive. 
They generated ill-will and toughened resistance to the U.S. position.” Much of this 
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had to do with the administration’s style, its unilateralist and often public approach, 
which raised questions of national pride and prestige. Administration specialists on 
Germany, such as Gregory Treverton in the NSC, worried about the “long-term risks” 
of such a confrontational approach, lest a “passing pique” turned into “a real change 
in German attitudes” toward the American partner. Two weeks after the Vance-
Schmidt meeting, Carter engaged in damage control in a letter to Schmidt, expressing 
his “hope that the arrangements between the Federal Republic and Brazil on nuclear 
energy will not become a major issue between us. I believe it is time to suspend 
further public or private debate, until you and I can sit down and try to work out this 
issue between us.” Schmidt responded in kind and when he summarized their first 
face-to-face meeting at the London Economic Summit in early May, he emphasized 
“that the atmosphere between him and President Carter is as good as cleared.” 
Significantly, the Brazil deal was not even among the issues Schmidt listed as having 
been discussed.
43
 
 Does this mean that the furor of the Brazil agreement died as suddenly as it 
had once erupted, as most scholars have argued? It is true that both governments 
shifted their attention from the specific agreement to non-proliferation in general, on 
which they found more common ground and which Carter approached in a more 
multilateral fashion. Nevertheless, attitudes to the Brazil agreement and particularly to 
reprocessing continued to color German and U.S. approaches. In a declaration 
deliberately timed to precede Carter’s on April 7, the German government 
emphasized its commitment to non-proliferation, but prioritized safeguards (as in the 
Brazil deal) over exclusions from technology. As in the discussions on Brazil, it 
emphasized the need to involve many countries in the development of a new non-
proliferation regime – an approach that at least some in the Carter Administration 
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feared would dilute a resolute approach to the question. Indicative of continued U.S. 
concerns, the Washington Post’s headline about Bonn’s declaration did not focus on 
the concession, but read “Bonn Goes Ahead with Plans for Reprocessing in Brazil”.
44
  
Carter’s announcement later that day was also conciliatory. The president 
acknowledged energy needs and even promised that “we are not trying to impose our 
will on those nations like Japan and France and Britain and Germany,” specifically on 
reprocessing. He also suggested an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation 
program (INCFE), which would explore ways to share safe nuclear energy – an idea 
that was interpreted as the most tangible concession to multilateralism. In another 
conciliatory gesture, Richard Cooper, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, 
told the European Commission that the previous embargo on uranium deliveries 
would be lifted within six weeks.
45
 Nevertheless, Washington’s signals continued to 
be mixed. Carter’s advisors were actually surprised and tried to relativize Carter’s 
apparent approval of other nations’ reprocessing. Just a few weeks after the 
declaration, Carter submitted a non-proliferation bill to Congress. While he tried to 
portray it as a concession to partners abroad as well, it contained stringent and 
unilateral provisions, demanding to renegotiate existing treaties of nuclear 
cooperation under the threat of cutting off supplies. Although it is outside of the 
purview of this study, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act became the topic of 
transatlantic controversy in 1978. Then, Schmidt referred to it as an “unfriendly act” 
and a “breach of law,” even though it turned out that Carter handled the law leniently 
and pragmatically.
46
 
Even Bonn’s final concession on nuclear exports failed to fully clear the air. In mid-
June, the German government declared that it would forsake further export of 
reprocessing plants and technology. While Schmidt personally explained to Carter, 
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“existing contracts and their application will not be affected by this decision,” 
effectively exempting the Brazil deal, the declaration did result in Bonn silently 
dropping its plans for nuclear cooperation with Iran.
47
 Despite these 
concessions, the Brazil agreement  continued to poison bilateral relations, attesting to 
far-reaching consequences not usually acknowledged. First of all, American officials 
did not give up the idea of altering the Brazil agreement. Carter’s response to 
Schmidt’s letter expressed the desire “that ways can be found to make these 
commitments consistent with our shared goals.” In a “non-proliferation policy 
progress report” in October, Warren Christopher reiterated  this hope. At the same 
time, the agreement impacted broader non-proliferation efforts. Despite Schmidt’s 
positive evaluation of the London Summit, a survey of the meetings illustrates how 
the issue intruded indirectly. Carter raised non-proliferation generally, particularly the 
idea of making full fuel cycles redundant through guaranteed supplies of enriched 
uranium. Nevertheless, he rejected as impractical another previously vented idea that 
the United States would store other nations’ spent fuel. At this point, Schmidt asked 
for clarification, ominously emphasizing the “big role” this question played in 
Germany. In a private conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, 
Schmidt triumphantly concluded: “This means that the USA does not want to offer a 
full supply cycle after all. It is now important to correct this American ideology of the 
offer of a full nuclear cycle also in public.”
48
 Schmidt’s desire to “expose” American 
falsehoods betrayed his continuing frustrations over the Brazilian controversy. He 
seemed to say that he had always been right: The United States was unable to offer a 
credible alternative to the German project. In the wake of the London Summit, 
Brzezinski realized the importance of accepting “spent fuel as a key incentive if other 
countries are to agree to forego reprocessing,” but such ambitious plans ultimately 
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failed to materialize. By the same token, U.S. officials felt that their non-proliferation 
policies suffered from the tacit acceptance of the Brazil agreement. As Michael 
Armacost, East Asian specialist on the NSC, put it, forcing Japan to refrain from 
reprocessing “after tacitly accepting the German sale of reprocessing technology to 
Brazil… would smack of gross discrimination against a close ally.”49 Despite 
concessions from both sides, the controversy continued to fester and color the 
perceptions Schmidt and Carter had of one another. 
 
 Strategies in the crisis confirmed another feature of West German foreign 
policy particularly in the 1970s – the desire to resist U.S. pressure by joining with its 
European neighbors. There was reason to believe that most European partners shared 
a similar outlook on nuclear issues, one informed more by the oil crisis than the 
explosion of the Indian bomb. In addition to that, France seemed to be in the same 
boat as West Germany with its own export ambitions to Pakistan.  
 From the beginning, German negotiators of the Brazil deal factored their 
European partners’ likely reactions into their own talks with the United States. Before 
concluding the agreement, officials sounded out European allies and Canada, 
believing that none of them generally favored more safeguards than Germany was 
seeking from Brazil. Although European representatives agreed to more stringent 
rules in the Suppliers Club in 1975 and 1976, they continued to discuss them 
according to whether they facilitated commercial competition. The discussions also 
indicated that the French and British would reject Washington’s desire for full fuel 
cycle safeguards for recipient countries of nuclear technology. The head of Section 4, 
Hans Lautenschlager, added that France would reject the idea of a two-year 
moratorium on reprocessing exports when it was first vented by the Ford 
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Administration. Whereas these evaluations symbolized an approach in which Bonn 
was happy to “hide behind” assumed European and particularly French interests and 
reactions, France also offered direct cooperation in nuclear matters in October 1975 to 
improve the competitiveness of both nations’ industries. This offer was in part a 
reaction to real and anticipated U.S. pressures. In general terms, Schmidt and Giscard 
d’Estaing discussed joint efforts to counter Carter’s non-proliferation offensive in 
February 1977.
50
 Hence, there seemed to be some potential to construct a European 
front against “excessive” American non-proliferation demands and possibly a Franco-
German alliance to protect the respective deals with Brazil and Pakistan. 
 Nevertheless, as early as 1975, there were signs that skepticism toward U.S. 
nuclear policies did not necessarily translate into support for the German-Brazilian 
agreement. In April 1975, the British government lodged a “fairly strong” diplomatic 
protest when Bonn requested the export of enrichment technology to Brazil through 
URENCO. London had the impression, the British diplomat continued, that Bonn was 
acting in a “fairly irresponsible way.” British fears were not allayed by a robust 
German defense of its deal or by the tripartite additional safeguards with the IAEA, as 
Bonn believed at the time. British discretion might just have made it easier to ignore 
the opposition. In internal preparations for German-British consultations in January 
1977, a Foreign Office official emphasized that London opposed the deal, but had 
refrained from saying so publicly because that “would evoke strong resentment in 
Bonn and could affect German willingness to help the UK in other fields.” Prime 
Minister Callaghan’s cautious remark that exporting sensitive technologies to Brazil 
constituted “a political risk” does not even seem to have elicited a response from 
Schmidt. British concerns continued, however, and would eventually be formulated 
more forcefully.
51
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 First consequential European resistance to Germany’s agreement with Brazil 
did not come from the nuclear weapons states, but from the Netherlands. As 
previously mentioned, the Federal Republic, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
had established URENCO in 1970 to jointly produce enriched uranium. In October 
1976, URENCO’s joint government committee signed an agreement with Brazil to 
provide enriched uranium for the German-built reactors. Just two months later, 
however, the Dutch government reneged and demanded tougher guidelines. Dutch 
Foreign Minister van der Stoel explained that his country did not want to play even an 
indirect part in the German-Brazilian agreement. German officials reacted angrily, 
even more so when they learned that van der Stoel had consulted with the Brazilians, 
creating the impression as if he spoke for URENCO. These issues were resolved in 
late 1977 with additional safeguards for URENCO uranium, but a new Dutch 
government questioned that compromise in early 1978. Although the Dutch resisted 
because of proliferation concerns, they only achieved a hardening of the German 
position, with Schmidt concluding that Germany needed its own enrichment plant. 
Testifying again to the potent mix of nuclear independence and national sovereignty, 
Schmidt insisted that “he would not allow the Federal Republic to be reduced to a 
third-rate country by the Dutch parliament.”
52
 
 The most serious disagreement, however, was developing between Germany 
and France, illustrating that, ultimately, both countries “tended to defend their own 
national interests rather than ‘European’ interests.”
53
 The first indication of a 
divergence of interest took the Germans by surprise. Pre-empting Carter’s 
inauguration, a newly inaugurated Nuclear Export Council in France proclaimed a 
moratorium on further exports of reprocessing plants in December 1976, while 
exempting the Pakistan deal. Less than two months later, however, the French told the 
Page 28 of 50
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rinh
The International History Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 29
Germans that they would be willing to relinquish even that agreement if Carter 
managed to persuade Pakistan. By late October 1977, Quai d’Orsay made the positive 
decision to stop the deal. Undersecretary Jean-Marie Soutou acknowledged “that 
France’s distancing from the controversial parts of the Pakistan deal dissolves the 
parallelism of the situation, in which France and the Federal Republic found 
themselves up to now, and that the defense of the Brazil deal will at least be 
complicated.”
54
 
 This decision isolated Germany as the lone “culprit” in American eyes and 
created direct friction between Bonn and Paris. In February 1977, the partners had 
difficulties agreeing on a joint declaration on non-proliferation, with Schmidt 
preferring vaguer language than that suggested by the French delegation. In 
contentious expert consultations one month later, Soutou clarified that France did not 
subscribe to the German claim that a ban of technology exports amounted to 
discrimination. This was a military question, Soutou asserted, “commercial aspects 
always have to take a backseat.” Subsequently, France focused on the Brazil deal 
itself. During the London Summit, Giscard d’Estaing warned Schmidt that “we do not 
like to become your accomplices” when Germany shared reprocessing technology 
with Brazil that might have originated in France. One month later, Schmidt reassured 
Giscard that this was not the case, but it was obvious that France took great pains to 
distinguish its own export policy from Bonn’s. Soutou explained what irked the 
French most about the Brazilian deal: It was Germany’s “’policy of justification’,” 
including the claims to non-discrimination, which suggested that more such 
agreements might be planned in the future. He therefore proposed de-escalating that 
rhetoric and a de facto halt in further exports. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
French hailed Bonn’s June declaration as a sign of “convergence.” In fact, some 
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authors believe that Bonn’s concession owed more to French than American pressure. 
At the same time, however, Bonn never replicated Paris’s step of halting a concluded 
deal.
55
 
 Although the French professed to act in the interest of non-proliferation, they 
realized that, in contrast to the Germans, they could safeguard their own commercial 
interests in the process. This difference was already discussed by Giscard and 
Schmidt in their consultations in February 1977. Despite committing to a common 
approach to the commercial aspects of nuclear energy, both conceded that France was 
in a stronger position as a nuclear weapons state in possession of a full nuclear fuel 
cycle. In addition to that, its nuclear industry was profitable at home whereas 
Germany’s depended on exports. As Carter’s and Congress’s plans for preventing the 
construction of new reprocessing facilities loomed, the gulf between Germany and 
France grew wider when it emerged that existing facilities, such as France’s, would 
not be affected. In fact, this approach created new export opportunities for the French. 
As Soutou explained, France would replace the transfer of reprocessing technology 
and facilities with the “credible guarantee of a full fuel cycle service.” The French 
realized that charging other nations for reprocessing services was more profitable than 
helping them build their own facilities, which would make them self-sufficient and 
competitive. Thus, French and German nuclear interests diverged increasingly, even 
in the commercial arena. The French emphasized this divergence to their British 
partners after the Franco-German consultations in February 1977 because they were 
“not too happy with the interpretation placed on the talks by some of the press, 
particularly the German press.”
56
 With France now opposed, a front of nuclear 
weapons states against Schmidt’s plans was in the making. An alternative front with 
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the likes of Italy, Japan, or Yugoslavia, who were also negatively affected by U.S. 
efforts, was hardly equivalent.
57
 
 
The Brazilian problem outlasted Carter’s more discreet approach, the 
multilateralization of non-proliferation efforts, and the German renunciation of further 
exports in June 1977. The U.S. administration kept pressuring the Brazilians, which 
irked the Germans as well. News of a reprocessing plant in Argentina seemed to 
prove the Americans right as they raised the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the 
Western Hemisphere. At a news conference during a visit to Brazil in March 1978, 
Carter repeated his opposition to the German-Brazilian agreement publicly. For his 
part, Schmidt had already clarified in late 1977 that, although he appreciated U.S. 
concerns about this development, he wished not to be drawn into the matter. He was 
not prepared to negotiate with Brazil in this regard and instead described the potential 
nuclearization of South America as “a matter for the Americans.” This reaction 
confirmed the ease with which Bonn divorced commercial interests from military 
implications.
58
 
 Behind closed doors, the European nuclear powers kept up the pressure as 
well. Even the Soviets registered their unease with the German government. 
Ambassador Falin warned Hermes of the “dangerous consequences” of the Brazil 
agreement. The French exasperated that Germany executed what France had 
renounced. When the cancellation of the Pakistan deal became public knowledge in 
late August 1978, Soutou told the Americans “that there was now a need to help the 
FRG to be more reasonable with regard to Brazil.”
59
 Even the “restrained” British 
eventually vented their frustration at Germany’s obstinacy. When Foreign Minister 
Louis de Guiringaud informed the American, British, and German foreign ministers 
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of a “delay” in the agreement with Pakistan in July 1978 (its effective cancellation 
had already been agreed upon, but not yet publicized) British Foreign Minister Owen 
welcomed the decision. In a sign of how sensitive the Germans had become, Genscher 
said “that he assumed there was no connection between US views on the possible sale 
of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan and the German agreement to sell such technology 
to Brazil.” At that moment, Owen became irritated, saying that “he had never 
criticized the FRG publicly for the Brazil deal but that he personally thought it was 
wrong to sell reprocessing technology to the Brazilians. Owen thought it would be 
beneficial if in the light of the French decision on Pakistan the FRG could also 
reexamine its position on the sale to Brazil,” which Genscher predictably declined.
60
 
Bonn was isolated among its major allies. 
 Tensions finally came to a head in late 1978. In the most dramatic attempt to 
stop the deal, Giscard claimed to have evidence that the Brazilians wanted to build an 
atomic bomb. The partners clashed even more seriously over German plutonium in 
the reprocessing plant at Le Havre, which the French only wanted to return when 
Germany had built a planned breeder reactor. While Bonn was outraged by France’s 
refusal to return German property, the French conjured up old fears of a German 
nuclear device. This fear – echoing Senator Symington’s warning in 1975 – 
demonstrates how easily historical phobias and stereotypes of an aggressive Germany 
could be marshaled even within a supposedly airtight alliance. The head of the 
Foreign Office’s planning staff, Klaus Blech, had intimated as much at the height of 
the controversy when he warned that U.S. politicians might find it easier to rationalize 
sanctions “with the suspicion that democratization and Westernization are ultimately 
only superficial” in Germany.
61
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 The Brazilian crisis was thus never resolved, but petered out and was 
superseded by other problems. The agreement itself remained on the books without 
yielding its full potential. In part because of Brazil’s financial difficulties, the 
agreement was substantially reduced and effectively halted at the end of the 1970s. 
One nuclear reactor, the most tangible result of the deal, became only operational in 
2000, and the lack of a full nuclear cycle led the Brazilian government to embark on 
an autonomous nuclear program in 1978.
62
 
Does that mean that the controversy was a tempest in a tea pot? On the 
contrary, the crisis was crucial in setting the tone for German-American relations 
throughout the Carter years, symptomatic of differing approaches to nuclear issues, 
and indicative of important structural features in the transatlantic alliance of the late 
1970s. Regarding nuclear energy, there were clearly different perceptions: Whereas 
the United States, already before Carter, shifted its focus to the potential of nuclear 
weapons proliferation through civilian programs, the Europeans, with the Germans 
among them, worried about energy self-sufficiency and commercial opportunity. 
Against the background of a previous predominance of U.S. companies in global 
nuclear markets, a recently unreliable supply with uranium, and, particularly for 
Germany, a costly development of nuclear energy that was not paying off 
domestically, this focus was understandable. Nevertheless, the degree to which the 
German government clung to this understanding in the face of drastic changes of U.S. 
nuclear commercial habits was remarkable. The disregard for incipient criticism 
during the Ford Administration and the overarching German justification, its emphatic 
legalism and “idealism,” demonstrated the determination with which the Schmidt 
government clung to the nuclear deal. It chose, as Alexander Kelle put it, 
“commercial considerations… over norms” or, as Helga Haftendorn emphasized, 
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“nuclear interests” over “allied relations.”
63
 Questions of nuclear proliferation, on the 
other hand, clearly took a backseat, particularly when Schmidt insinuated that nuclear 
weapons were the exclusive concern of nuclear weapons states. In this regard, the 
Schmidt government seemed happy to leave the military dimension of nuclear power 
to the superpower, thereby implicitly choosing and perpetuating the dependent Cold 
War security relationship. 
On the other hand, the Brazilian controversy demonstrated how a resurgent 
West Germany bristled at U.S. unilateralism and interference in matters of national 
sovereignty. In December 1978, Schmidt met the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, W. 
Michael Blumenthal, to discuss global economic matters. When Blumenthal deplored 
that many traditional multilateral institutions no longer worked, Schmidt suddenly 
exploded in frustration: 
[T]hese mechanisms worked as long as all partners agreed that the only 
relevant voice was that of the United States. This is no longer the case. 
Furthermore, American problems have changed. At that time [in the 1960s], 
the US had its hands full with containing Soviet influence in the world. 
Today, the US is cooperating with the USSR and both are attempting to 
restrain their allies... The Chancellor recalled that President Carter attempted 
to stop the German nuclear deal with Brazil in the spring of 1977... In future, 
contentious questions have to be discussed among the partners; resolutions 
cannot be unilaterally proclaimed.
64
 
The fact that Schmidt raised the Brazilian controversy when the discussion revolved 
around different issues demonstrates how deeply this first major controversy had 
damaged bilateral relations. For the German government, it symbolized everything it 
did not like about the Carter Administration – an excess of moralism and “ideology,” 
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behind which some Germans still suspected commercial motives, an indiscreet public 
approach that pressured partners and, above all, a unilateralism and “superpower 
condominium” that was no longer appropriate for a world, in which Europe and its 
constituent nations had acquired added weight and influence. 
 While this article has primarily focused on the German perspective, Bonn’ 
reaction demonstrated that Carter’s approach to the crisis had undermined his own 
professions of multilateralism and had ended up more than confirming Kissinger’s 
prophecies: Not only had Washington been unable to stop the German-Brazilian 
agreement and realize its non-proliferation objectives, it had also alienated a close 
ally. With publicly formulated maximum demands and pressure, the style of 
negotiations had been almost as disastrous as their substance. Persisting with the 
agreement in the face of U.S. opposition became a matter of national pride for a more 
self-confident West Germany, which had successfully “experimented” with a more 
independent foreign policy in Ostpolitik. How much pride played a role in German 
thinking at the time was exemplified in an exchange between Schmidt and the 
Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, whose position on non-proliferation mirrored 
Carter’s. When Trudeau denied that restrictions on nuclear exports were 
discriminatory or that they violated national pride, Schmidt retorted: “You have to 
accept national pride before you start a conversation. It is not good to tell other 
nations: ‘You do not know what is good for you.’” By the same token, Schmidt was 
proud of how he had faced down Carter. In his memoirs, he wrote: “We also 
withstood Carter’s attempt... to force us to break our contract with Brazil.”
65
 
 There was thus an awkward dichotomy in the German reaction: a stubborn 
insistence on the legitimacy of the Brazilian agreement and on Germany’s national 
sovereignty, but on the other hand a strange reluctance to consider potential military 
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implications of nuclear exports. Perhaps, the trajectory of German post-war policies 
best explains this paradox. Trade policies had been “safe” territory for German 
foreign policy, turning the country into the world’s premier export country by the 
1970s. Military policies, on the other hand, had always been left to the Americans and 
the other European nuclear powers. When both realms collided, as in the controversy 
over civilian nuclear power export programs, German foreign policy struggled to find 
a suitable response. This struggle was represented in the infighting in Bonn’s Foreign 
Office, where the Brazil deal found an enthusiastic lobby in those who had risen 
through the foreign trade division, but skeptical opponents in the political division 
who feared grave consequences for transatlantic relations and non-proliferation. 
 Finally, the crisis also underlined the limits of European unity. There seemed 
to be great potential for a united European front against Carter’s policies because 
most European nations focused on the commercial and energy potential of nuclear 
programs. Nevertheless, as Carter’s policy evolved, especially after they became more 
multilateral with INCFE, some nations began to support U.S. views, while others – 
foremost the French – realized that the nuclear powers would remain privileged and 
that renouncing the export of sensitive technology was not necessarily a disadvantage. 
By the end of the crisis, Bonn was isolated among its closest allies. The fact that it 
clung to the Brazil deal regardless testifies to the shift in transatlantic power relations 
in the late 1970s. The Brazil agreement itself ultimately foundered on unrelated 
financial difficulties.  
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